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Career of Charlemagne, by Guizot, Francois P. G.

Life of Charlemagne

World History Center

Holy Roman Empire, The
Book: Supplementary Chapter: The New German Empire
Author: Bryce, James
Date: 1901
 

Page Twenty Four


Part II.

The Federal Constitution, while recognizing fully the sovereignty of the
princes in their own territories, had made only the feeblest provisions for
the concession of popular rights and the establishment of representative
institutions in the several states. Almost the only expression which it
allowed to be given to the idea of national unity was in the creation of a
central federal body, the Diet, wherein only the princes and not their
subjects were represented, which was empowered to act in foreign affairs, and
might be made by the great princes the means of repressing any liberal
movements on the part of an individual member. But this did not satisfy
Metternich. The excitement produced by the War of Liberation did not at once
subside: the ideas of freedom, national unity, national greatness, which it
had called forth, had obtained a dominion over the minds of the German youth;
and were eloquently preached by some of the noblest spirits among its
teachers. These ideas however, innocent as they would now appear, and well
founded as was the jealousy of Russian influence which prompted their
expression, were marked with fear and suspicion by the narrow minds of the
Prussian king and the minister of Francis of Austria. In 1819, therefore,
Metternich brought together, as if by accident, the ministers of ten leading
German courts at Karlsbad in Bohemia, and procured their assent to a series of
measures extinguishing the freedom of the press, restraining university
teaching, forbidding societies and political meetings, and erecting a sort of
inquisition at Mentz for the discovery and punishment of democratic agitators.
These measures were soon after adopted by the Federal Diet at Frankfort, and
followed by conferences of ministers at Vienna. These produced the instrument
known as the Vienna Final Act (Schlussakt) of 1820, whereby the constitution
of the Confederation was further modified in a reactionary and anti-national
spirit. Such securities as existed for the rights of the subject in the
several states were diminished, while the Diet saw its powers enlarged
whenever they could be employed for the suppression of free institutions, and
received a frightfully wide police jurisdiction through the territories of the
minor princes.

This Karlsbad Conference struck the keynote of the policy of the Federal
Diet during the three and thirty dreary years that lie between 1815 and the
brief though bright awakening of 1848 ^1. If the selfishness of rulers were
not the commonest moral of history, there would be something extraordinary as
well as offensive in the horror of change and reform which was now exhibited
by these very princes who had, with Napoleon's help or connivance, carried out
by the mediatization of their weaker neighbours a revolution far more
sweeping, and in point of law less defensible, than any which the patriotic
reformers now proposed. These potentates, especially those of Northern
Germany, were for the most part possessed by the same reactionary feelings as
their two great neighbours; their rule was harsh and repressive, conceding
little or nothing to the demands of their subjects, and prepared, especially
after their alarms had been renewed by the revolution of 1830 in France, to
check the most harmless expressions of the aspirations for national unity.
Such unity now appeared further off than ever. While the old Empire lasted,
princes and peoples owned one common head in the Emperor, and lived under a
constitution which had descended, however modified, from the days when the
nation formed a single powerful state. Now, by the mediatization of the
lesser principalities, the extinction of the Reichsritterschaft (knights of
the Empire), the absorption of all the free cities save four, the class which
had formed a link between the princes and the mass of the nation had been
removed; the sovereigns had, in becoming fewer, become more isolated and more
independent; they were members rather of the European than of the German
commonwealth. Those moral effects of the War of Liberation, from which so
much had at first been hoped, now seemed to have been lost utterly and for
ever.

[Footnote 1: See L. K. Aegidi, Aus dem Fahre 1819.]

Meanwhile the German liberals laboured under the immense difficulty of
having no legitimate and constitutional mode of agitation, no lever, so to
speak, by which they could move the mass of their countrymen. They were mere
speakers and writers, because there was nothing else for them to do; dreamers
and theorists, as unthinking people in more fortunate countries called them,
because the field of practical politics was closed to them. In only a few of
the states did representative assemblies exist; and these were too small and
too limited in their powers to be able to stimulate the political interests of
their constituents. Prussia herself had no parliament of the whole monarchy
until 1847: up to that year there had been only local 'Landes Stande;' estates
or diets for the several provinces.

The liberal party had two objects to struggle for - the establishment or
extension of free institutions in the several states, and the attainment of
national unity. As respects the first of these, it may be remarked that the
mere passion for freedom in the abstract has never produced a great popular
movement. Englishmen, Swiss, and Americans may, through long habit, think it
essential to national happiness; but it is generally desired rather as a means
than as an end: and there must always exist, in order to rouse a people to
disaffection or insurrection, either such a withdrawal of liberties previously
enjoyed as wounds its pride and conservative feeling, or else the infliction
by the governing power of positive evils which affect the subject in his daily
life, his religion, his social and domestic relations. Now in Germany, and
particularly in the Prussian State, such liberties had not been known since
primitive times; and there were few serious practical grievances to be
complained of. From the time of Frederick the Great the country had been well
and honestly administered; conscience was free, trade and industry were
growing, taxation was not heavy, the press censorship did not annoy the
ordinary citizen, and the other restraints upon personal freedom were only
those to which the subjects of all the Continental monarchies had been
accustomed. The habit of submission was strong; and there existed in most
places a good deal of loyalty, irrational perhaps, but not therefore the less
powerful, towards the long-descended reigning houses. In several of the petty
states there was indeed serious mis-government, and an arbitrary behaviour on
the sovereign's part which might well have provoked revolt. Hessen-Cassel, for
instance, was ruled by the unworthy minions of a singularly contemptible
prince; and in Hanover King Ernest Augustus on his accession in 1837 abolished
by a stroke of the pen the constitution which had been granted by his
predecessor William. But these states were too small for a vigorous political
life; the nobility depended on the Court and were disposed to side with it;
the power of the Confederation hung like a thunder-cloud on the horizon, ready
to burst wherever Austria chose to guide it. It was therefore hard for the
liberals to excite their countrymen to any energetic and concerted action; and
when the governments thought fit to repress their attempts at agitation, this
could be harshly done with little fear of the consequences.

In labouring for the creation of one united German state out of the
multitude of petty principalities, the party of progress found themselves at a
still greater disadvantage. There was indeed a sentimental wish for it, but
only a sentiment; an idea which worked powerfully upon imaginative minds, but
had little hold on the world of fact and reality, little charm for the
steady-going burgher and the peasant whose vision was bounded by his own
valley. Some considerable practical benefits might no doubt have been
expected from its realization, such as the establishment of a common code of
laws, the better execution of great public works, the protection of the nation
from the aggressions of France and Russia; but these were objects whose
importance it was hard to bring home to the average citizen in peaceful times.
And where was the movement towards unity to begin? Not in the Federal Diet,
of all places, for it consisted of the envoys of princes who would have been
the first to suffer. Not in the local legislatures, for they had no power to
deal practically with such questions, and would speedily have been silenced
had they attempted by discussing them to influence the policy of their
masters. It was therefore only through the carefully guarded press, and
occasionally in social or literary gatherings, that appeals to the nation
could be made, or the semblance of an agitation kept up. There was no point
to start from: it was all aspiration and nothing more; and so this movement,
to which so many of the noblest hearts and intellects of Germany devoted
themselves (though the two greatest stood aloof), made during many years
little apparent progress. The Zollverein was indeed created, and thereby a
bond of union established whose advantages were soon felt, but this was done
by the individual action of Prussia and the several States which one after
another entered into her views, not by the Diet as a national work. Meanwhile
the strictness of the repressive system was still maintained: Prussia, though
now ruled by the more liberal Frederick William the Fourth, was still silent:
the influence of Metternich was still supreme.

Then came the revolution of 1848. The monarchy of Louis Philippe fell
with a crash that sounded over Europe, and every German and Italian throne
rocked to its foundation. In Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, and Munich, not to
speak of smaller capitals, there came, sooner or later, risings more or less
formidable; constitutions were promised or granted by the terrified princes:
the Federal Diet, after a hasty declaration in favour of the liberties it had
so long withheld, abdicated to make way for a national Parliament, which was
duly summoned, and met at Frankfort on the 18th of May, 1848. This assembly
appointed as Administrator of the Empire (Reichsverweser) the Archduke John of
Austria, and began to frame a constitution for united Germany. According to
the draught, completed early in 1849, Germany was to be a federal state, under
a hereditary emperor, irresponsible, but advised by responsible ministers; and
with a parliament of two houses, one representing the states, members of the
Empire; the other the people. On the 28th of March the assembly offered the
imperial dignity to the King of Prussia ^1. He hesitated to accept it without
the consent of the other sovereigns; and exactly a month afterwards definitely
refused it, fearing the jealousy of some of the princes, although twenty-nine
of them had already expressed their approval of the scheme; disliking several
parts of the new constitution, and feeling himself too weak and irresolute to
take the helm of the German state at a moment of such difficulty and
confusion. His refusal was a great, and as it proved, a fatal discouragement
to the liberals, for it disunited them, and it destroyed their hopes of a
powerful material support. Nevertheless the Frankfort assembly sat for some
months longer, till, having migrated to Stuttgart, it dwindled down at last
into a sort of rump parliament, and was suppressed by force, while Prussia, at
first in conjunction with Hanover and Saxony, started other and narrower plans
for national organization, schemes modelled after those of 1785 and 1806, but
of which nothing ever came ^2. Meantime the governments had recovered from
their first alarm. Austria had reconquered North Italy, and had by Russia's
help overpowered the Magyars; France had restored the Pope; everywhere over
Europe the tide of reaction was rising fast. In 1850 Austria and Prussia took
from the Archduke John such shadow of power as still remained to him as
Reichsverweser, and at the conferences of Olmutz Prussia resumed her attitude
of submissive adherence to Austria's policy. By the middle of 1851 the
Confederation was re-established on its old footing, with its old
powerlessness for good, its old capacities for mischief, and, it may be added,
its old willingness to use those capacities for the suppression of free
institutions in the more progressive states.

[Footnote 1: In 1847, when things seemed quiet enough, Frederick William IV
had opened negociations with Austria with a view to improving the constitution
of the Confederation, and making better provision for common defence and for
internal communication. In the Berlin revolution of March, 1848, he had
behaved with irresolution, no doubt, but had shown some real sympathy for the
people. And this he had: he heartily desired both the well-being, and to a
certain extent, the freedom of his own people and the greatness of Germany;
but he was unhappily entangled with notions of divine right and various other
mediaeval whimsies and sentiments.]

[Footnote 2: They were debated at great length by an assembly convoked at
Gotha.]

The effects, however, of the great uprising of 1848 were not lost in
Germany any more than in Italy and Hungary. It had made things seem possible
- seem even for a moment accomplished - which had been till then mere visions;
it had awakened a keen political interest in the people, stirred their whole
life, and given them a sense of national unity such as they had not had since
1814. By shewing the governments how insecure were the foundations of their
arbitrary power, it had made them less unwilling to accept change; it had
taught peoples how little was to be expected from the unforced goodwill of
princes. From this time, therefore, after the first reaction had spent
itself, one may observe a real though slow progress towards free
constitutional life. In some of the smaller states, and particularly in
Baden, it soon came to be the policy of the government to encourage the action
of the local parliament; and the Prussian assembly became in its long and
spirited struggle with the crown a political school of incomparable value to
the rest of Germany as well as to its own great kingdom.

One other thing more the events of 1848-1850 did most effectively for the
Germans, if indeed that wanted doing: they made clear to the nation the
hopelessness of expecting anything from the Confederation. During the last
sixteen years of its existence, nothing, if we except the promulgation under
its sanction of a general code of commercial law, was done by the Federal Diet
for national objects: its deliberations had for many years been carried on in
secret; it spoke with no authority to foreign princes, and behaved with
sluggish irresolution in the question which was again beginning to agitate
Germany, of the succession to Schleswig and Holstein, and the relation of
these duchies to the Danish Crown.

The restoration of the Federal constitution in 1850-51 was at the time
regarded as merely provisional, accepted only because Austria and Prussia
could not be got to agree upon any new scheme; and the successive projects of
reform which thereafter emanated, sometimes from governments, sometimes from
voluntary associations, kept the question of the reorganization of Germany and
the attainment of some sort of national unity, constantly before the people.
Thus, although nothing was done, and the weary discussions which went on moved
the laughter of other nations, the way was secretly but surely paved for
revolution. In 1859 the liberals organised themselves in what was called the
National Union (National-Verein), a body containing numerous members in nearly
all the German States, and among them many distinguished publicists and men of
letters. It held general meetings from time to time; and, when occasion
arose, its permanent committee issued pamphlets and manifestoes, explaining
the views and recommending the policy of the party. This policy was not a very
definite one, so far as practical measures were concerned, yet tolerably clear
in its ultimate object - viz. the union of all Germany in one Federal state
(whether republican or monarchical), and if necessary, the absolute exclusion
of Austria therefrom. This last feature procured for it from her adherents
and from the German conservatives generally, the name of the Little German
(Kleindeutsch) party; and they, assuming the title of Great Germans
(Grossdeutschen, i.e. the advocates of a Germany which should include
Austria), founded in 1862 a rival association, which called itself the Reform
Union, and in like manner held meetings and issued manifestoes. It found
strong support in Hanover, Bavaria, and Wurtemburg, but comparatively little
in the middle states, and of course still less in Prussia. Its policy was
mainly defensive; while the National Union, whose tendencies would naturally
have been philo-Prussian and aggressive, found itself embarrassed by what
seemed the resolutely reactionary attitude taken up by the Prussian king and
ministers in the affairs of their own kingdom. A contest respecting the
organization and payment of the army had broken out between the Government and
the Chamber - a contest embittered first by the accession to the throne of the
feudally-minded King William I (hitherto Regent), whose assertion of the
principle of divine right at his coronation at Konigsberg had surprised and
displeased thinking people, and afterwards by the admission to the chief place
in the ministry of a statesman who was then supposed to be the champion of
tyranny and feudalism, even of the Austrian alliance. During the struggle
which raged in the years 1862-64, and which at some moments seemed to threaten
revolution, it was impossible for Germany to hope for anything from a power
which refused to work constitutional government at home, and treated the
representatives of the people with a roughness under which no one could tell
that there lay concealed a substantial community of purpose.

The liberals of the South and West were therefore in 1863 disposed fairly
to abjure Prussia as given over to a reprobate mind; and Austria thought she
saw her opportunity. Encouraged by the partial success which had attended his
efforts to unite and pacify the different provinces of the monarchy by the
creation of a Reichsrath, Count Schmerling conceived the hope of recovering by
an appeal to the nation the ancient primacy of the Hapsburgs, and thrusting
the now unpopular Prussia into the background. Accordingly in August, 1863,
the Emperor Francis Joseph invited the reigning princes and representatives of
the free cities to meet him at Frankfort, to discuss a scheme of federal
reform which he there propounded, and which, while it increased the power of
Austria, appeared to strengthen the cohesion of the Confederation, and to
introduce, though insufficiently, a popular element into its constitution.
All save one attended; but that one was the King of Prussia. He had in the
preceding year taken for his prime minister Otto Edward Leopold, Freiherr of
Bismarck-Schonhausen in the Old Mark of Brandenburg, a man who, having been
Prussian representative in the Federal Diet from 1851 to 1859, had learned by
experience the weakness of that body and its subservience to Austria, and was
now becoming impatient to try some speedier, and if necessary more forcible,
method than diplomatic discussion of putting an end to the existing dead-lock.
At his suggestion, the Prussian Court refused to have anything to do with the
Austrian scheme, which fell therewith to the ground, and the Diet was troubled
by no change for the rest of its unhonoured life.

Austria, however, would probably have tried to carry through her project
had not another question suddenly arisen, which turned all thoughts in a
different direction, threw the German powers into new relations to one
another, and became at last the cause of the dissolution of the Confederation
itself. In November, 1863, Frederick VII, king of Denmark died; and the
contest so long foreseen and delayed between the Danes and the Germans,
respecting their rights over Schleswig and Holstein, broke out with unexpected
vehemence.

The Danish constitution of 1855 had incorporated these two Duchies with
Denmark for all purposes, although Holstein had always been a part of Germany,
while Schleswig was by law indissolubly united to Holstein, and although the
inhabitants even of Schleswig were in great majority of German speech. The
Federal Diet had protested long ago against this constitution as an infraction
of its rights, but it was not till October, 1863, that it decreed federal
execution against Denmark. When, a few weeks later, Christian IX succeeded to
the throne in virtue of the arrangements which Frederick VII had been
empowered to make by the Treaty of London in 1852, no steps had as yet been
taken to give effect to the decree. But the eyes of Europe were at once
turned upon the new sovereign, whose title was disputed, and when, under the
pressure of the heated populace of Copenhagen, he acceded to the constitution
incorporating the duchies with Denmark, he found himself and his kingdom at
once committed to the struggle. Prince Frederick of Augustenburg ^1 claimed
Schleswig and Holstein, and was supported not only by a considerable party in
both duchies, but by the general sentiment of the Germans, who saw in his
candidature the only chance of saving them from the Danes. The agitation in
Germany soon grew vehement, and that the faster because the question was one
upon which all parties and sects could unite. The National Union and Reform
Union met, fraternised, and appointed a joint permanent committee, which
issued addresses to the nation, established Schleswig-Holstein Unions
throughout the country, and promoted the enlistment of bands of volunteers,
who hurried to the border. Even the Federal Diet, though the opposition of
Prussia and Austria prevented it from recognising Frederick as Duke, carried
out (against the will of those powers) the resolution for federal execution by
sending in December, 1863, a body of Saxons and Hanoverians to occupy
Holstein.

[Footnote 1: Prince Frederick had never assented to Frederick VII's
arrangements, and contended that he was not barred by his father's
renunciation of the rights of the family.]

Prussia had a difficult game to play, and she played it with consummate
skill. Her ministers were unwilling to aid the Prince of Augustenburg, both
because she was bound to Denmark as one of the signataries of the Treaty of
London ^1, and because their views of the future included other contingencies
which it would then have been premature to mention. But if hope and the voice
of the nation called on them to act, prudence forbade them to act alone. It
was essential to carry Austria along with them, not only because the Austrian
alliance would be needed if England, France, and Russia threatened war, but
because she could in this way be made to share the unpopularity which
backwardness in the national cause was bringing upon Prussia, and because she
was thus alienated from Bavaria, Hanover, and the other states of the second
rank, with which her relations had been, especially since the Frankfort
Congress, so close and cordial. When the co-operation of Austria had been
secured - partly by adroitly playing on her fears of the democratic and almost
revolutionary character which the Schleswig-Holstein movement was taking in
Germany, partly by her own reluctance to let Prussia gain any advantage by
acting alone against Denmark - the Prussian government resolved to take the
control of the quarrel out of the hands of the Diet, so as to decide the fate
of the two Duchies in the way most favourable to their own plans for the
reconstruction of North Germany. Accordingly Prussia and Austria appealed, as
they were undoubtedly entitled to do, to certain provisions of the Treaty of
London, recognising the special rights of Schleswig; and summoned Denmark to
withdraw at once the law of November 18th, 1863, whereby Schleswig was finally
incorporated with the Danish monarchy. When the Danes refused, a strong
Prussian and Austrian force was poured into the Duchies, not without
considerable indignation on the part as well of the rest of Germany as of the
Prussian liberals, who believed that the object of this invasion was to check
the national movement, expel Prince Frederick, and hand over Schleswig to
Christian IX. They were soon better informed. Early in 1864 the united army
passed the Danewerk, stormed Duppel, overran Jutland, and had the Danish king
and people entirely at their mercy. A Conference was summoned in London; but
it broke up without effecting anything; and when the Germans resumed
hostilities, and it was clear that the expected help from England, Russia, or
France ^2 would not be forthcoming, Denmark submitted, and by the Treaty of
Vienna (October, 1864) ceded Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to the allied
powers absolutely. Prussia then pushed the Saxons and Hanoverians out of
Holstein, and began to strengthen herself and make arrangements for the
administration of the territory she occupied; while Austria, seeing this,
began to hesitate, and suspect, and doubt whether her course had been
altogether wise. She was soon to be still more cruelly undeceived.

[Footnote 1: The Confederation was not bound by the Treaty of London, as it
had never been laid before the Diet. Prussia and Austria were]

[Footnote 2: It has been commonly believed that Russia would not aid the Danes
on account of her obligations to Prussia during the Polish insurrection; and
that Louis Napoleon refused to stir because he was disgusted at the cold
reception given to his proposal for a general European Congress not very long
before. The inaction of England was attributed on the Continent partly to the
personal influence of the Sovereign, partly to the supposed prevalence of
'peace at any price' doctrines. But it really was in large measure due to the
fact that English statesmen and public writers found, when they looked into
the matter, that the Danes were substantially in the wrong, though no doubt
the hesitation of France, without whose aid it would have been folly to stir,
had something to do with the matter.]

Now that the Danes were for ever dispossessed, the question arose - what
was to become of the Duchies. Everybody expected the recognition of Prince
Frederick of Augustenburg: the Diet was clearly in his favour, and Austria
seemed quite willing. Prussia, however, refused to consent. Her crown
lawyers, to whom the whole matter had been referred, while not attempting to
advocate certain ancient hereditary claims that had been put forward on behalf
of the house of Hohenzollern, pronounced in an elaborate opinion that the
title of Christian IX was legally preferable to that of Prince Frederick, and
that, as his title had passed by the cession to the two allied powers, the
latter were now entirely free to deal with the ceded territories as they
pleased. Nevertheless, she professed herself ready to recognise Frederick as
duke upon certain conditions, which were declared to be essential to the
safety of Prussia on her north-west frontier, as well as to the protection of
Schleswig-Holstein itself against the hostility of Denmark. These conditions
included not only a strict defensive and offensive alliance of the new
principality with Prussia, but an incorporation of its army and fleet with
hers, an absorption of its postal and telegraphic system, the cession of its
fortresses, and, in fact, a pretty complete subjection to her authority in
military matters and in external politics. These proposals were, as was
expected, rejected by Prince Frederick, trusting to the support of Austria,
and buoyed up by the general sympathy which his pretensions found not only in
the rest of Germany, but even in the Prussian Chamber, which still maintained
unshaken its opposition to the foreign policy and schemes of military
organization of Herr von Bismarck's government. Meanwhile, voices began to be
raised in the Duchies for annexation to Prussia; Austria grew more and more
suspicious; the relations of the officials of the two powers established in
the conquered territory became daily less friendly. Things seemed fast
ripening towards a war, when, on the mediation of Bavaria and Saxony, the
Convention of Gastein was signed between the rival sovereigns in the autumn of
1865. By this treaty Schleswig was in the meantime to be held by Prussia,
Holstein by Austria, the question of the ultimate disposal of both duchies
being reserved; while Austria sold her rights over Lauenburg to Prussia for
2,500,000 rix-dollars. This was felt to be a hollow truce, and its
hollowness, despite the efforts of the Diet to arrange matters, was soon
manifest. The Austrian authorities, knowing that they could not permanently
retain Holstein, allowed an agitation to be kept up there on behalf of Prince
Frederick. Prussia vehemently protested against this, and required Austria to
maintain the status quo. Notes of complaint and recrimination were constantly
passing between the two powers ^1; notes whose tone became always more
menacing. Then each accused the other of arming, Austria summoning the Diet
to prepare to restrain Prussia, Prussia beginning to shadow forth plans for a
reform in the federal constitution. Meanwhile both states were arming fast,
and it became clear that the only question was which could first strike a
blow, and upon what allies each could rely ^2. Prussia had secured Italy:
Austria managed to carry with her the majority of the greater German princes.
In the memorable last sittings of the Diet of June 11th and 14th, 1866,
Austria's motion to mobilize the federal contingents, with a view to execution
against Prussia, was supported by Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg,
Hessen-Cassel, Hessen-Darmstadt, and several of the minor states, thus giving
her a large majority; while, for Prussia's counter-proposition for a reform in
the constitution of the Confederation, there voted only Luxemburg and four of
the 'curiae,' consisting of northern and middle states of the third rank,
seventeen in all out of the thirty-three. The partisans of both sides having
thus committed themselves, there was no use in further resisting Austria in
the Diet; so Prussia, having entered her protest against its proceedings,
withdrew from the Confederation, declared war upon Hanover and Saxony on June
16th, upon Austria on June 18th, and pushed her armies forward with a speed
which seemed almost to paralyse her opponents.

[Footnote 1: Austria at one time proposed to let Prussia have Holstein in
exchange for part of Silesia: at another she offered to leave the disposal of
the Duchies to be determined by the Diet. Prussia refused both propositions,
well knowing, as regards the latter, that the decision of the Diet was
foregone.]

[Footnote 2: The immediate cause of the war was the convocation by Austria of
the states of Holstein, in order to pronounce on the rights of Prince
Frederick. This Prussia declared to be an infraction of the Convention of
Gastein; and her troops accordingly crossed the Eider, in order to re-occupy
Holstein in virtue of her condominate rights under the treaty of Vienna.
Austria withdrew to avoid a collision; and made her final motion in the Diet
which brought on the declaration of war.]