Part Three

     The sight of these mountains, whose tops seem to touch the skies, and

were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few

pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible

rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perishing with cold, and hairy men of

a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle renewed the terror which the

distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.

^816 When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had

seized upon the highest cliffs, and prepared to oppose their passage.  They

therefore were forced to halt.  Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain

in ambuscade and suffered Hannibal's troops to strike into some narrow

passage, and then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have

been irrecoverably lost.  Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts

only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of

them by night.  The Gauls, returning early in the morning, were very much

surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hands; but still they were not

disheartened.  Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the

Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The

latter were obliged, at the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle

with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly

stand.  But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of

burden laden with the baggage, that were frighted by the cries and howling of

the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains; and being sometimes

wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them

headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road.  Hannibal,

being sensible that the loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his

army, ran to the assistance of his troops who were thus embarrassed, and

having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or

danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the

whole country.  He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighboring

villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and sufficient cattle to

subsist his army for three days.

[Footnote 816: Polyb. l. iii. pp. 203-208.  Liv. l. xxi. n. 32-37.]

     Although their march was for a short time uninterrupted, the

Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger.  The Gauls, feigning to take

advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbors, who had suffered for opposing

the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general,

brought him provisions, offered to be his guides, and left him hostages, as

pledges of their fidelity.  Hannibal, however, placed no great confidence in

them.  The elephants and horses marched in the front, while himself followed

with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all.  They came at

length to a very steep and narrow pass, which was commanded by an eminence,

where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden

assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a

prodigious size.  The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal

exerted himself, in an extraordinary manner, to extricate them out of this

difficulty.

     At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps.  Here the

army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue,

after which they continued their march.  As it was now autumn, a great

quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a

consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal

perceived it, and halting on a hill, from whence there was a prospect of all

Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains of Piedmont, watered by the river

Po, which they had nearly reached, adding that they had but one more effort to

make, before they arrived at them.  He represented to them, that a battle or

two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by

giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire.  This speech, full

of such pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the

dejected soldiers with fresh vigor and alacrity.  They therefore pursued their

march.  But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever, and as

they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased.  For the ways

were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could

neither keep their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made

a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.

     They were now come to a place worse than any they had yet met with. This

was a path naturally very steep and craggy, which being made more so by the

late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice more than a

thousand feet deep.  Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at

this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it would really be impossible

for the troops to advance.  He therefore was for making a circuitous route,

but this also was found impracticable.  As upon the old snow, which was

growing hard by lying, there was some lately fallen that was of no great

depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but

this snow being soon dissolved by the treading of the foremost troops and

beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so

slippery that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least

false step, or endeavored to save themselves with their hands or knees, there

were no boughs or roots to catch hold of.  Besides this difficulty, the horses

striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling,

could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin.  They therefore

were forced to seek some other expedient.

     Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days'

rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent, after

they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the

new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labor.  He afterwards ordered a

path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing

patience and labor.  To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabout

were cut down, and piled round the rock, and there set on fire.  The wind,

fortunately blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock

glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if

Livy may be credited, for Polybius says nothing of this matter, caused a great

quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock, ^817 which piercing into the

veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense hear of the fire, calcined

and softened it.  In this manner, making a large circuit, in order that the

descent might be easier, they cut a way along the rock, which opened a free

passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants.  Four days were

employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden had no provender,

there being no food for them on mountains buried under eternal snows.  At last

they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage

for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.

[Footnote 817: Many reject this incident as fictitious.  Pliny takes notice of

a remarkable quality in vinegar, viz.: its being able to break rocks and

stones. - Saxa rumpit infusum, quae non ruperit ignis antecedens, l. xxiii. c.

1.  He therefore calls it, Succus rerum domitor. l. xxxiii. c. 2.  Dion,

speaking of the siege of Eleuthra, says, that the walls of it were made to

fall by the force of vinegar, l. xxxvi. p. 8. Probably the circumstances that

seems improbable on this occasion, is the difficulty of Hannibal's procuring,

in those mountains, a quantity of vinegar sufficient for this purpose.]

Hannibal Enters Italy

     When Hannibal marched into Italy, his army was far less numerous than

when he left Spain, where we find it amounted to nearly sixty thousand men.

^818 He had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles he

was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers.  At his departure from the

Rhone, it consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand

horse.  The march over the Alps destroyed nearly half this number, so that

Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand

Spanish foot, and six thousand horse.  This account he himself caused to be

engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Licinium.  It was five months

and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the

fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standard

in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont.  It might then have been

September.

[Footnote 818: Polyb. l. iii. pp. 299, 212-214.  Liv. l. xxi. n. 39.]

     His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much

wanted.  When he perceived that they were fit for action, the inhabitants of

all the territories of Turin ^819 refusing to conclude an alliance with him,

he marched and encamped before their chief city, carried it in three days, and

put all who had opposed him to the sword.  This expedition struck the

barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily and surrendered

at discretion.  The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not

been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching.

Hannibal thought, therefore, that he had no time to lose; that it was his

interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit, such as

might induce those who should have an inclination to join him to rely on his

valor.

[Footnote 819: Taurini.]

     The rapid progress which Hannibal had made greatly alarmed Rome, and

caused the utmost consternation throughout the city.  Sempronius was ordered

to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the

other consul, advanced with the utmost diligence towards the enemy, crossed

the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus. ^820

[Footnote 820: A small river, now called Tesino, in Lombardy.]

Battle Of The Cavalry Near The Ticinus

     The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to

their soldiers, before they engaged in battle. ^821 Scipio, after having

represented to his forces the glory of their country, and the noble

achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their

hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had

been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for

twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the

advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a

sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in

marching over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army, and

that those who survived were exhausted with hunger, cold, and fatigue: that

the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of

soldiers, who had the aspect of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that

victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy, but to save Rome

itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, that city having no other

army wherewith to oppose the enemy.

[Footnote 821: Polyb. l. iii. pp. 214-218.  Liv. l. xxi. n. 39-47.]

     Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude

minds of his soldiers, addressed himself to their eyes, before he addressed

their ears; and did not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he had

first moved them by the following spectacle.  He armed some of the prisoners

he had taken in the mountains, and obliged them to fight, two and two, in the

sight of his army, promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and

rich presents.  The alacrity and vigor wherewith these barbarians engaged upon

these motives, gave Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a

lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means

of returning back, put them under an absolute necessity either of conquering

or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should

be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans.  He displayed to them the

greatness of their reward, viz.: the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the

rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory.  He

spoke contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which, he observed,

ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the

pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations into the very centre of

Italy.  As for his own part, he scorned to compare himself with Scipio, a

general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least

brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar, his father; the conqueror of Spain, of

Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and, what was still more remarkable, of

the Alps themselves.  He roused their indignation against the insolence of the

Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken

Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excited their jealousy against

the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things

ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the world.

     After these speeches, both sides prepared for battle.  Scipio, having

thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops over it.  Two ill omens

had filled his army with consternation and dread. ^822 As for the

Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage.  Hannibal animated

them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he

was sacrificing, he prayed to Jupiter to dash his head in pieces in like

manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.

[Footnote 822: These two ill omens were, first, a wolf had stole into the camp

of the Romans and cruelly mangled some of the soldiers, without receiving the

least harm from those who endeavored to kill it; and, secondly, a swarm of

bees had pitched upon a tree near the praetorium, or general's tent. - Liv. l.

xxi. c. 46.]

     Scipio posted in the first line, the troops armed with missile weapons,

and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the

confederate cavalry, he advanced slowly.  Hannibal advanced with his whole

cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rode with

bridles, and the Numidian horse on the wings, in order to surround the enemy.

^823 The officers and cavalry, being eager to engage, the battle commenced.

At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers discharged their darts, but

frightened at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and

fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way,

and retired through the intervals of the squadrons.  The fight continued a

long time with equal success.  Many troopers on both sides dismounted; so that

the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry.  In the mean

time, the Numidians surrounded the enemy, and charged the rear of the

light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and

trod them under their horses' feet.  The centre of the Roman forces had

hitherto fought with great bravery.  Many were killed on both sides, and even

more on that of the Carthaginians.  But the Roman troops were thrown into

disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear: and especially by a

wound the consul received, which disabled him.  This general, however, was

rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen

years old, and who afterwards was honored with the surname of Africanus, for

having put a glorious period to this war.

[Footnote 823: The Numidians used to ride without saddle or bridle.]

     The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was

conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and

bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither.  He hastened to the Po,

which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he

prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.

     It was agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and

it was judged from thenceforth, that the main strength of his army consisted

in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid

large open plains like those between the Po and the Alps.

     Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighboring Gauls

seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him

with ammunition, and enlist in his army.  And this, as Polybius has observed,

was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the

small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed

was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever

he should desire to do it, because nothing but a battle would oblige the

Gaul's to declare for him: their assistance being the only refuge he then had

left.

Battle Of Trebia

     Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate,

was returned from Sicily to Ariminum. ^824 From thence he marched towards

Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above

Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced

towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small

river.  The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent

skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained

but a very small advantage over a party of Carthaginians, which nevertheless

very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his

own merit.

[Footnote 824: Polyb. l. xxiii. pp. 220-227.  Liv. l. xxi. pp. 51-56]

     This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory.  He boasted

his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his

colleague had been defeated, and that he thereby had revived the courage of

the dejected Romans.  Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible,

to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency sake, to consult

Scipio, whom he found to be of a quite different opinion from himself.  Scipio

represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new

levies during the winter, they would be much more fit for service in the

ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant,

would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his

wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of

such general concern; in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any

farther.

     These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw

himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies,

exclusive of cavalry, which number, in those ages, formed a complete army,

when both consuls joined their forces.  The troops of the enemy amounted to

near the same number.  He thought the juncture extremely favorable for him.

He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a

battle, except his colleague, whose mind, he observed, being more affected by

his wound than his body, could not for that reason bear to hear of an

engagement.  But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army

droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more?  Did he flatter

himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his

assistance?  Such were the expressions he employed, both among the soldiers,

and even about Scipio's tent.  The time for the election of new generals

drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had

put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take

advantage of his colleague's illness to secure the whole honor of the victory

to himself.  As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for

action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could

not fail of taking wrong measures.  He therefore ordered his army to prepare

for battle.

     This was the very thing Hannibal desired, holding it for a maxim, that

when a general has entered a foreign country, or one possessed by the enemy,

and has formed some great design, that such an one has no other refuge left,

but continually to raise the expectation of his allies by some fresh exploits.

Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and

inexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking every advantage possible of

the ardor of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of

Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the

battle.  Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men,

consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet, which ran

between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes, that were very

thick there.  An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full

of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be

suspected.  He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the

Trebia, with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of

the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and

repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them.  What he had

foreseen, came exactly to pass.  The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his

whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops,

who were soon followed by the rest of the army.  The Numidians fled

designedly; upon which the Romans pursued with great eagerness, and crossed

the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced

to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swollen with

the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighboring mountains.  It

was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December.  It happened to snow

that day, and the cold was excessively piercing.  The Romans had left their

camp fasting, and without taking the least precaution; whereas the

Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eat and drank plentifully in their

tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put

on their armor by the fire-side.

     They were thus prepared when the fight began.  The Romans defended

themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with

hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to

flight by that of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and

strength.  The infantry also were soon in great disorder.  The soldiers in

ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed suddenly upon their rear, and

completed the overthrow.  A body of about ten thousand men fought their way

resolutely through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful

slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to their

camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river and the

rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their

lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and

horses.  Those who escaped, joined the body above mentioned.  The next night

Scipio also retired to Placentia.  The Carthaginians gained a complete

victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of

their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow: and that, of

all their elephants, they saved but one.

     In Spain, the Romans had better success, in this and the following

campaign, ^825 for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river

Iberus, ^826 defeated Hanno, and made him prisoner.

[Footnote 825: Polyb. l. iii. pp. 228, 229.  Liv. l. xxi. n. 60, 61.]

[Footnote 826: Or Ebro.]

     Hannibal took the opportunity, while he was in winterquarters, to refresh

his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.  For this purpose, after

having declared to the prisoners he had taken from the Roman allies, that he

was not come with the view of making war upon them, but to restore the

Italians to their liberty, and protect them against the Romans, he sent them

all home to their own countries without requiring the least ransom. ^827

[Footnote 827: Polyb. l. iii. p. 229.]

     The winter was no sooner over, than he set off towards Tuscany, whither

he hastened his march for two important reasons. ^828 First, to avoid the ill

effects which would arise from the ill-will of the Gauls, who were tired with

the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and impatient of

bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other

view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy.  Secondly, that

he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the

minds of all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates

of Rome, and at the same time, reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies,

by the plunder of the enemy's territories.  But in his march over the

Appenines, he was overtaken with a dreadful storm, which destroyed great

numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire

his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in

crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than these they now suffered.  He

therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who had

returned from Rome.  The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.

[Footnote 828: Liv. l. xxi. n. 52.]

     While Hannibal was in these winter-quarters, he hit upon a stratagem

truly Carthaginian. ^829 He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations;

the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date.  He had

reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and consequently that

attempts would be made upon his life.  To secure himself, therefore, he got

perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one,

sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not only those who saw

him transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarcely know him.

[Footnote 829: Polyb. l. xxii. n. 1 Appian. in Bell. Annib. p. 316.]

     At Rome, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius had been appointed consuls. ^830

Hannibal having advice that the latter was advanced already as far as

Arretium, a town of Tuscany, resolved to go and engage him as soon as

possible.  Two ways being shown him, he chose the shortest, though the most

troublesome, nay, almost impassable, by reason of a fen which he was forced to

go through.  Here the army suffered incredible hardships. During four days and

three nights, they marched half leg deep in water, and consequently could not

get a moment's sleep.  Hannibal himself who rode upon the only elephant he had

left, could hardly get through.  His long want of sleep, and the thick vapors

which exhaled from that marshy place, together with the unhealthfulness of the

season, cost him one of his eyes.

[Footnote 830: A. M. 3788.  A. Rome, 532.  Polyb. pp. 230, 231.  Liv. 1. xxii.

n. 2.]

Section I.

Battle Of Thrasymene

     Hannibal thus extricated, almost unexpectedly, out of this dangerous

situation, refreshed his troops, and then marched and pitched his camp between

Arretium and Fesulae, in the richest and most fruitful part of Tuscany. ^831

His first endeavors were, to discover the genius and character of Flaminius,

in order that he might take advantage of his errors, which, according to

Polybius, ought to be the chief study of a general.  He was told that

Flaminius was very self-conceited, bold, enterprising, rash, and fond of

glory.  To plunge him the deeper into these excesses, to which he was

naturally prone, ^832 he inflamed his impetuous spirit, by laying waste and

burning the whole country in his sight.

[Footnote 831: Polyb. l. iii. pp. 231-238.]

[Footnote 832: Apparebat ferociter omnia ac praepropere acturem.  Quoque

pronioz esset in sua vitia, agitare eum atque irritare Poepus parat. - Liv. l.

xxii. n. 5.]

     Flaminius was not of a disposition to remain inactive in his camp, though

Hannibal should have lain still.  But when he saw the territories of his

allies laid waste before his eyes, he thought it would reflect dishonor upon

him should he suffer Hannibal to ravage Italy without control, and even

advance to the very walls of Rome, without meeting any resistance.  He

rejected with scorn the prudent counsels of those who advised him to wait the

arrival of his colleague; and to be satisfied for the present with putting a

stop to the devastation of the enemy.

     In the mean time Hannibal was still advancing towards Rome, having

Cortona on the left hand, and the lake Thrasymene on his right.  When he saw

that the consul followed close after him, with the design to give him battle,

by stopping him in his march; having observed that the ground was convenient

for that purpose, he also began to prepare himself for battle. The lake

Thrasymene and the mountains of Cortona form a narrow defile, which leads into

a large valley, lined on both sides with hills of considerable height, and

closed at the outlet by a steep hill of difficult access.  On this hill,

Hannibal, after having crossed the valley, came and encamped with the main

body of his army; posting his light-armed infantry in ambuscade upon the hills

on the right, and part of his cavalry behind those on the left, as far almost

as the entrance of the defile, through which Flaminius was obliged to pass.

Accordingly, this general, who followed him very eagerly, with the resolution

to fight him, having reached the defile near the lake, was forced to halt,

because night was coming on; but he entered it the next morning at daybreak.

     Hannibal having permitted him to advance with all his forces more than

half way through the valley, and seeing the Roman vanguard pretty near him, he

sounded the charge, and commanded his troops to come out of their ambuscade,

that he might attack the enemy, at the same time, from all quarters.  The

reader may guess at the consternation with which the Romans were seized.

     They were not yet drawn up in order of battle, neither had they got their

arms in readiness, when they found themselves attacked in front, in rear, and

in flank.  In a moment all the ranks were put in disorder. Flaminius, alone

undaunted in so universal a consternation, animated his soldiers both with his

hand and voice; and exhorted them to cut themselves a passage with their

swords through the midst of the enemy.  But the tumult which reigned

everywhere, the dreadful shouts of the enemy, and a heavy fog prevented his

being seen or heard.  When the Romans, however, saw themselves surrounded on

all sides, either by the enemy or the lake, and the impossibility of saving

their lives by flight, it roused their courage, and both parties began the

fight with astonishing animosity. Their fury was so great, that not a soldier

in either army perceived an earthquake which happened in that country, and

buried whole cities in ruins.  In this confusion, Flaminius being slain by one

of the Insubrian Gauls, the Romans began to give ground, and at last turned

and fled. Great numbers, to save themselves, leaped into the lake; while

others, directing their course to the mountains, fell into the enemy's hands

whom they strove to avoid.  Only six thousand cut their way through the

conquerors, and retreated to a place of safety; but the next day they were

taken prisoners.  In this battle fifteen thousand Romans were killed, and

about ten thousand escaped to Rome, by different roads.  Hannibal sent back

the Latins, who were allies of the Romans, into their own country, without

demanding the least ransom.  He commanded search to be made for the body of

Flaminius in order to give it burial but it could not be found.  He afterwards

put his troops into quarters of refreshment, and solemnized the funerals of

thirty of his chief officers, who were killed in the battle.  He lost in all

but fifteen hundred men, most of whom were Gauls.

     Immediately after, Hannibal despatched a courier to Carthage, with the

news of the success in Italy.  This caused the greatest joy for the present,

raised the most promising hopes with regard to the future, and revived the

courage of all the citizens.  They now prepared, with incredible ardor, to

send into Italy and Spain all necessary succors.

     Rome, on the contrary, was filled with universal grief and alarm, as soon

as the praetor had pronounced from the rostra the following words, We have

lost a great battle.  The senate, studious of nothing but the public welfare,

thought that in so great a calamity, and so imminent a danger, recourse must

be had to extraordinary remedies.  They therefore appointed Quintus Fabius

dictator, a person as conspicuous for his wisdom as his birth.  It was the

custom at Rome that the moment a dictator was nominated, all authority ceased,

that of the tribunes of the people excepted.  M. Minucius was appointed his

general of horse.  We are now in the second year of the war.

Hannibal's Conduct With Respect To Fabius

       Hannibal, after the battle of Thrasymene, not thinking it yet proper to

march directly to Rome, contented himself, in the mean time, with laying waste

the country. ^833 He crossed Umbria and Picenum; and after ten days' march,

arrived in the territory of Adria. ^834 He got a very considerable booty in

this march.  Out of his implacable enmity to the Romans, he commanded, that

all who were able to bear arms should be put to the sword; and meeting no

obstacle anywhere, he advanced as far as Apulia, plundering the countries

which lay in his way, and carrying desolation wherever he came, in order to

compel the nations to disengage themselves from their alliance with the

Romans, and to show all Italy, that Rome itself, now quite dispirited, yielded

him the victory.

[Footnote 833: Polyb. l. xxiii. pp. 239-255.  Liv. l. xxii. n. 9-30.]

[Footnote 834: A small town, which gave name to the Adriatic sea.]

     Fabius, followed by Minucius and four legions, had marched from Rome in

quest of the enemy, but with a firm resolution not to let him take the least

advantage, nor to advance one step till he had first reconnoitred every place;

nor hazard a battle, till he should be sure of success.

     As soon as both armies were in sight, Hannibal, to terrify the Roman

forces, offered them battle, by advancing almost to the intrenchments of their

camp.  But finding every thing quiet there, he retired; blaming in appearance

the outward cowardice of the enemy, whom he upbraided with having at last lost

that valor so natural to their ancestors; but fretting inwardly, to find he

had to act with a general of so different a genius from Sempronius and

Flaminius; and that the Romans, instructed by their defeat, had at last made

choice of a commander capable of opposing Hannibal.

     From this moment he perceived that the dictator would not be formidable

to him by the boldness of his attacks, but by the prudence and regularity of

his conduct, which might perplex and embarrass him very much.  The only

circumstance he now wanted to know was, whether the new general had resolution

enough to pursue steadily the plan he seemed to have laid down.  He

endeavored, therefore, to rouse him, by his frequent removals from place to

place, by laying waste the lands, plundering the cities, and burning the

villages and towns.  He, at one time, would raise his camp with the utmost

precipitation; and at another, stop short in some valley out of the common

route, to try whether he could not surprise him in the plain.  However, Fabius

still kept his troops on the hills, but without losing sight of Hannibal;

never approaching near enough to come to an engagement, nor yet keeping at

such a distance, as might give him an opportunity of escaping him.  He never

suffered his soldiers to stir out of the camp, except to forage, and not even

on those occasions without a numerous convoy.  If ever he engaged, it was only

in slight skirmishes, and so very cautiously, that his troops had always the

advantage.  This conduct revived, by insensible degrees, the courage of the

soldiers, which the loss of three battles had entirely damped; and enabled

them to rely, as they had formerly done, on their valor and success.

     Hannibal, having got immensely rich spoils in Campania, where he had

resided a considerable time, left there with his army, that he might not

consume the provisions he had laid up, and which he reserved for the winter

season.  Besides, he could no longer continue in a country of gardens and

vineyards, which were more agreeable to the eye, than useful for the

subsistance of an army; a country where he would have been forced to take up

his winter-quarters among marshes, rocks and sands; whereas the Romans would

have drawn plentiful supplies from Capua, and the richest parts of Italy.  He

therefore resolved to settle elsewhere.

     Fabius naturally supposed that Hannibal would be obliged to return the

same way he came, and that he might easily annoy him during his march. He

began by throwing a considerable body of troops into Casilinum, thereby

securing that small town, situated on the Vulturnus, which separated the

territories of Falernum from those of Capua; he afterwards detached four

thousand men, to seize the only narrow pass through which Hannibal could come

out; and then, according to his usual custom, posted himself with the

remainder of the army on the hills adjoining the road.

     The Carthaginians arrived, and encamped in the plain at the foot of the

mountains.  And now, the crafty Carthaginians fell into the same snare he had

laid for Flaminius at the defile of Thrasymene; and it seemed impossible for

him ever to extricate himself out of this difficulty, there being but one

outlet, of which the Romans were possessed.  Fabius, fancying himself sure of

his prey, was only contriving how to seize it. He flattered himself with the

probable hopes of putting an end to the war by this single battle.

Nevertheless, he thought fit to defer the attack till the next day.

     Hannibal perceived that his own artifices were now employed against him.

^835 It is in such junctures as these, that a general has need of great

presence of mind, and unusual fortitude, to view danger in its utmost extent,

without being struck with the least dread; and to find out sure and instant

expedients, without deliberating.  The Carthaginian general immediately caused

two thousand oxen to be collected, and ordered small bundles of vine branches

to be tied to their horns.  He then commanded the branches to be set on fire

in the dead of night, and the oxen to be driven with violence to the top of

the hills, where the Romans were encamped.  As soon as these creatures felt

the flame, the pain putting them in a rage, they flew up and down on all

sides, and set fire to the shrubs and bushes they met in their way.  This

squadron, of a new kind, was sustained by a good number of light-armed

soldiers, who had orders to seize upon the summit of the mountain, and to

charge the enemy in case they should meet them.  All things happened which

Hannibal had foreseen.  The Romans, who guarded the defile, seeing the fires

spread over the hills which were above them, and imagining that it was

Hannibal making his escape by torchlight, quit their posts and run to the

mountains to oppose his passage.  The main body of the army not knowing what

to think of all this tumult, and Fabius himself not daring to stir, as it was

excessively dark, for fear of a surprise, waited for the return of the day.

Hannibal seized this opportunity, marched his troops and the spoils through

the defile, which was now unguarded, and rescued his army out of a snare, in

which, had Fabius been but a little more vigorous, it would either have been

destroyed, or at least very much weakened.  It is glorious for a man to turn

his very errors to his advantage, and make them subservient to his reputation.

[Footnote 835: Nec Annibalem fefellit suis se artibus peti. - Liv.]

     The Carthaginian army returned to Apulia, still pursued and harassed by

the Romans.  The dictator being obliged to take a journey to Rome, on account

of some religious ceremonies, earnestly entreated his general of horse, before

his departure, not to fight during his absence.  Minucius however did not

regard either his advice or his entreaties, but the very first opportunity he

had, while part of Hannibal's troops were foraging, charged the rest, and

gained some advantage.  He immediately sent advice of this to Rome, as if he

had obtained a considerable victory.  The news of this, with what had just

before happened at the passage of the defile, raised complaints and murmurs